PROLEGOMENA TO AN EDITION OF ALBERT’S *TOPICS*

Albert the Great’s monumental commentary on the *Topics* has barely received attention from scholars in medieval philosophy, which may not surprise us, as there is no critical edition available.¹ I have the intention to undertake this Herculean task starting from the collations of all manuscripts made by the late Paul Hossfeld at the Albertus-Magnus-Institut in Bonn. It is my pleasure to dedicate this preliminary investigation of the manuscript tradition to Henryk Anzulewicz, to whom all Albert scholars are indebted.

1. The text tradition

The complete text of Albert’s *Topica* is preserved in eight manuscripts:² Erlangen UB 202 (E), Paris BNF lat. 16101 (P) and BNF lat. 16108 (Pa) of the late 13th century, Basel ÖBU F I 18 (B), Brugge St B 488 (Br) and Kraków Bibl. Jag. 639 (K) of the early 14th century, and finally two early 15th century manuscripts Firenze, Laurentianus Conv. Sopp. 195 (F) and Paris BNF lat. 14707 (Ps). There is also the edition published in 1494 by Johannes and Gregorius de Gregoriis “Opera excellentissimi philosophi Alberti Magni super tota logica Aristotelis,” which contains on f. 146r–202r the *Topics*. What we now read in the Borgnet edition (p = ed. Paris, vol. II, 1890) goes back via the edition of Jammy (Lyon, vol. I, 1651) to this 1494 edition. Some errors have been corrected but some new typos were made. A collation of all manuscripts makes evident that five manuscripts (B Br K Pa Ps) share an impressive number

¹There is one honourable exception: W.A. Wallace, “Albert the Great’s Inventive Logic: His Exposition of the *Topics* of Aristotle,” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* (70), 1966, 11–39.

of errors (362 cases), in particular omissions (74 cases) and large omissions by homoioteleuton (10 cases). Besides these common errors and other characteristics, each of these five manuscripts has its own errors, which exclude that the more recent depend upon the older. The most evident hypothesis to explain the common features of these five manuscripts is to assume that they all ultimately depend on a now lost exemplar. This exemplar was probably the university exemplar kept by the stationarius in Paris at the end of the 13th century. In the list composed in Paris in 1304 by André de Sens, an exemplar of Albert’s *Topics* is mentioned: “in commento Thopicorum XXI. pec. XVI den.”. There are also indirect indications of a transition of pecias in the Basel manuscript.³ The five manuscripts thus represent the Parisian university tradition of the text (which I will call Π): the 1494 edition also belongs to this tradition; it is in particular related to the late copy Ps with which it has many features in common. However, the humanist editor massively intervened with conjectures to make the transmitted text readable. Whoever did this editorial work, he was a great Albert scholar. Three manuscripts do not belong to the university tradition (E F P). E and P are the oldest surviving manuscripts of Albert’s *Topics*: they were both copied in Paris by the end of the 13th century. P contains in its first part Thomas Aquinas’ commentary on the *Periermeneias*, which was directly copied from a university exemplar of this text.⁴ In the second part, it has Albert’s *Topics* and *Sophistici Elenchi*. One might therefore presume that Albert’s works too were copied from a university exemplar. This is certainly not the case with the *Topics*: P does not share the particularities of the university tradition, as present in B Br K Pa Ps. Copied about the same time as P is the Erlangen manuscript. Before it entered the university library, it belonged to the Cistercian abbey of Heilsbronn. However, it was copied in Paris, as is clear not only from its writing, but also from the fact that a monk wrote on f. 79v a receipt for a payment received at 1322 in the Collège des Bernardins in Paris. This convent was used as residence for Cistercian monks during their study time in Paris.⁵ Although the Parisian origin of E and P is unquestionable, they were not copied from the university exemplar, as they do not share its characteristics. On the other hand, they share with the university tradition numerous errors, as will become clear when we confront their text with F. Therefore, we must suppose that E and P were copied from

³In IV, tr. II, cap. 1, p. 380a, a full column remains empty after “est verecundia;” the text resumes on the next folio with “sed verecundia propter quod etiam;” a large section on a folio remains empty in VII, tr. 1, c. 2, p. 482a between “ex tali positione alterum” and “alterum eorum quae idem.”


a manuscript (α) that was present in Paris at the late 13th century and that was later used to compose the university exemplar. One finds a similar situation in the transmission of Albert’s *Logica vetus*, where the Parisian manuscript Cambrai Bibl. municipale 961, was copied at the end of the 13th century from the exemplar that later served as model for the university exemplar.⁶ As we shall see, E and P share with the university exemplar Π a number of errors, which all were present in subarchetype α, a copy made from Albert’s autograph and sent to Paris after 1260–1263 (probable date of composition of the *Topics*).

I now turn to the youngest of all eight manuscripts, Firenze Laurent. Conv. Sopp. 195. This manuscript, which contains both Albert’s *Topics* and his *Posterior Analytics*, was copied in Bologna in 1427. As the colophon of the two works tell us, Master Priamus de Sacrato from Ferrara had this copy made for him, when he was a student in the arts faculty in Bologna:

f. 108va: Expliciunt libri Thopicorum secundum magistrum Albertum Magnum artium et sacre theologoe doctorem venerabilissimum quos fecit scribere Magister Priamus de Sacrato de Feraria dum esset artium studens Bononie (mg.) et compilati fuerunt anno domini MCCCC o vigesimo septimo die octava Aprilis.

f. 211vb: Expliciunt libri Posteriorum Analeticorum secundum magistrum Albertum Magnum artium et sacre theologoe doctorem venerabilissimum quos fecit scribere Magister Priamus de Sacrato de Feraria in artibus Bononie studens anno domini MCCCC o XXVII die XXVIIIº mensis Januarii.

In the same year, Priamus had also a copy made of Albert’s *Logica vetus*, the actual Vaticanus Rossianus 693:

f. 217vb: Explicit ars vetus secundum magistrum Albertum magnum artium sacre theologoe doctorem venerabilissimum quam fecit scribere magister Priamus de Sacrato de Feraria. Anno domini MCCCC o XXVII die ultima januarii (feb. exp.).

In this case we also know the name of the copyist: Heinricus de Meynungen, a cleric from the diocese of Würzburg (f. 69va).

Finally, Priamus also ordered a copy of the last work of Albert’s logic, the *Sophistici Elenchi*, the actual Roma, Angelicus 97:

f. 69va: Expliciunt libri Elenchorum secundum artium sacre theologoe doctorem venerabilissimum Albertum Magnus quos fecit scribere Magister Priamus de Sacrato de Feraria, dum esset Bononie in artibus studens, anno domini millesimo quadringentesimo vigesimo septimo die decima aprilis.

⁶See the introduction of C. Steel and S. Donati in M. Santos-Noya, C. Steel, S. Donati (eds.) *Alberti Magni De Praedicamentis* (Editio Coloniensis, I.1B), Münster 2013, p. XIII–XIV.
Priamus, who studied in Bologna and later became master at the university in Ferrara,\(^7\) belonged to a rich noble family from Ferrara, the Sacrati.\(^8\) Priamus was obviously a great admirer of Albert’s *Logic*, as he possessed an almost complete set of his logic (lacking is *De divisione* and the *Prior Analytics*). In a scholion on f. 2v of the *Topics*, which is probably in his hand, Albert’s view is praised as ‘subtilis, pulchra, substantialis’. He was also a rich man, who had the means, as a student (!), to order personal copies of the author he admired. The Florence manuscript is a luxurious copy on parchment. At the beginning of the *Topics* there is a beautiful illuminated initial representing Albert. Decorations with the coat of arms of the Sacrati family are found at the beginning of each book. The beauty and precious character of a manuscript are not a sufficient argument to assign it an important place in a critical edition. The scribe of *F* makes often errors in reading abbreviations and has made 132 omissions by homoiooteleuton not present in any other manuscript. A beautiful, but alas mediocre copy of the text, it might seem. However, notwithstanding the irritating number of errors, *F* offers also throughout the commentary numerous good readings against mistakes shared by all other manuscripts. It has often alone the right reading when all other manuscripts deriving from subarchetype \(\alpha\) have errors due to the wrong interpretation of abbreviations in the autograph, as for instance (in the first chapters):

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\text{notum factum } F\] \text{ necessariam scientiam } \alpha // \text{ dispositionem } F\] \text{ diffinitionem } \alpha // \text{ falsum } F\] \text{ factum } \alpha // \text{ prout stat sub } F\] \text{ quod noscat sub } \alpha // \text{ potentissimae } F\] \text{ purissimae } \alpha // \text{ verius } F\] \text{ virtus } \alpha // \text{ scitur } \alpha // \text{ ex terminorum } F\] \text{ exteriorum } \alpha // \text{ erimus } F\] \text{ ex arte } \alpha // \text{ facile } F\] \text{ facultate } \alpha // \text{ in usu et operatione } F\] \text{ in eosdem operationes } \alpha // \text{ contemplatur } F\] \text{ exemplatur } \alpha // \text{ procedunt } F\] \text{ concedunt } \alpha // \text{ sicut } F\] \text{ sed est } \alpha // \text{ medium } F\] \text{ manifestum } \alpha.

Moreover, on many places *F* supplies one or two words obviously lacking in all other manuscripts. Besides, there are about fifteen cases where *F* offers a text where all other manuscripts seem to have an omission by homoiooteleuton (see examples below). Of course, on cannot exclude that many of the good readings are due to conjectures of a scholar editing a corrupted text. Such an editorial revision was made in preparation of the first edition, which was published in 1494. As said, this edition substantially belongs to the university tradition (Ps). However, the editor introduced numerous ingenious corrections, often rewriting the text, without any manuscript basis. A modern critical editor will gratefully accepts some of these corrections, though most of them are superfluous. In some


\(^8\)On the manuscript collection of the Sacrati family see J. Ruysschaert and R. Ridolfi, *Recherche des deux bibliothèques romaines Maffei des XV\textsuperscript{e} et XVI\textsuperscript{e} siècles*, Florence 1959, p. 325.
cases, small corrections in the edition correspond even to what we read in F. For an assessment of the possible contribution of F to a critical edition of Albert’s *Topics* it is of the greatest importance to determine whether the good readings in F result from a similar editorial correction or may have come from the original text of Albert without passing through the Parisian tradition (and its errors). An indication of an editorial correction may be the fact that many good readings and supplements in F correspond to the text of Aristotle. Somebody could have corrected Albert’s paraphrase by confronting it to an exemplar of the Aristoteles Latinus. On the other hand, the fact that the text of F is disfigured by so many errors and omissions that were not corrected is an argument against the hypothesis of a corrected text. In order to determine the question, I have selected a number of ‘supplements’ in F, i.e. passages lacking in all other manuscripts that certainly could never have come from the genius of a later scholar. For that reason I left out additions that could have been made by someone collating Albert’s text with a copy of Aristotle’s *Topics* and supplementing whatever was lacking in Albert. I first discuss three examples (2, 3, 4), which offer strong arguments for the hypothesis that F has preserved authentic texts lacking in all other manuscripts, and add at the end (5) a list of other supplementary passages without comment.⁹

2. Rules for dealing with ambiguity

*Topica*, lib. II, tr. 1, cap. 4 (p. 299b–300a):

Propter quod dicitur communiter quod loquendum ut plures, sentiendum *autem*¹⁰ ut pauci, quia sapientes sunt pauci. Si autem aliquis obiciat quod nominum *sunt*¹¹ imposita a rerum proprietatibus et formis et sic a sapientibus, *quia*¹² sapientum est hoc considerare, et loquendum et vocabulis utendum, prout sunt imposita, et sic videtur quod loquendum sit ut sapientes: dicendum quod hoc verum est quod a proprietatibus rerum sapientes imposuerunt et imponunt vocabula; sed *et*¹³ ab exterioribus rei imposita sunt et communes et sic sunt in usu communiter loquentium, et hoc modo etiam in¹⁴ loquendo sumenda sunt

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⁹ In the Latin texts quoted below underlining indicates Aristotelian passages, italics additions and corrections coming from F, bold corrections made by the editor. The collations are taken from Hossfeld except for E and F which I collated myself. References of Albert’s works are to the ed. Coloniensis when available; if not, to the Borgnet edition. In my commentary I freely use and adapt the translation of E. Forster in the Loeb edition of the *Topics*.
¹⁰ *autem* F: amico α (om. K)
¹¹ *sunt* F: om. α
¹² *quia* F: et α
¹³ *et* F: om. α
¹⁴ *in* om. F
vocabula. Sed sapientes in usu vocabulorum profundatas in rebus inspicient proprietates et ad illas referunt vocabula et ideo transgrediuntur positam locutionem et ideo peccant in problematibus. Propter quod\textsuperscript{15} non est loquendum ut sapientes et\textsuperscript{16} maxime in rerum diffinitionibus et descriptionibus, quae loco nominum sive vocabulorum ponuntur, ut ista docuit consideratio. Idoneus ergo sic efficietur in dicta\textsuperscript{17} consideratione [efficitur]\textsuperscript{18} opponens, si apertam\textsuperscript{19} in universali proponat\textsuperscript{20} instantiam et si voce\textsuperscript{21} nominum refert ad plures, et rerum virtutes et causas et effectus refert ad sapientes sive paucos, qui secundum intellectum iudicant de rebus propositis.

Amplius, si obscuritas \textit{est}\textsuperscript{22} in propositione proposita\textsuperscript{23}, aut erit obscuritas propter multiplex aliquod\textsuperscript{24} in oratione proposita, aut aliter obscuratur\textsuperscript{25} oratio, propter \textit{quod}\textsuperscript{26} non conceditur a respondente. Et si quidem est propter\textsuperscript{27} multiplex, oportet quod illud sit multiplex \textit{secundum actualem multiplicitatem aequiprovationis vel amphycholye}\textsuperscript{28}, quia potentiale phantasticum multiplex\textsuperscript{29} non valet\textsuperscript{30} ad disputationem dialecticam, cum non deserviat\textsuperscript{31} nisi deceptionis\textsuperscript{32} sophisticae, si cut est multiplex in compositione et divisione et figura dictionis. Si autem in propositione vel problematico proposito\textsuperscript{33} dicatur aliquid esse multiplex, sive dicatur sic quoniam inest praedicatum subiecto in propositione \textit{affirmativa, aut quoniam non inest praedicatum subiecto}\textsuperscript{34} in propositione\textsuperscript{35} negativa, hoc erit dupliciter in aequiprovoco multiplici; aut enim multiplex latet respondentem aut non latet ipsum\textsuperscript{36} multiplex quod propositum est. Si quidem latet respondentem\textsuperscript{37}
In *Topics* II, 3 Aristotle discusses rules for dealing with ambiguity. He distinguishes between cases where the ambiguity escapes the opponent and where it is obvious. In the above passage, Albert first examines with Aristotle when we should use the language of the majority and when rely on the definitions of experts. He explains the celebrated adage (which is also found among the auctoritates Aristotelis) that “one ought to talk as the majority, but think as the few who are wise.” More important for the text tradition is the next paragraph, in which Albert explains in what sense we must here take ambiguity. It must be an “actual multiplicity,” not a “potential multiplicity,” which is present in the imagination. As he says, the latter form of ambiguity has no place in a dialectical discussion; it only plays a role in sophisms, in deceiving, where the ambiguity is based upon the composition of the argument and upon the figure of speech, whereas the ambiguity Aristotle discusses in the *Topics* is an ambiguity found in the proposed problem. As one can see, F has two supplements lacking in all other witnesses of the text. The addition cannot come from a later editor/corrector of Albert’s text. For no later scholar could have added sui ingenio the strange formulation “potentiale phantasticum multiplex.” The latter phrase makes clear that we have here an authentic text of Albert, as can be shown from the following parallel in *De sophisticis elenchis*, lib. I, tr. 2, cap. 1 (p. 537a): “Quia multiplicitas actualis est ante multiplicitatem potentialis et phantasticam, aequivocatio autem et amphibologia dicunt multiplicitatem actualis, caeterae autem fallaciae in dictione dicunt multiplicitatem potentialis et phantasticam, iode prius agendum de aequivocationis et amphibologiae paralogismis. Et quia aequivocatio in dictione, amphibologia autem in oratione, iode prius de modis paralogismorum aequivocationis, quam amphibologia est agendum.” One should notice the connection made between *amphibologia* and *aequivocatio*, which are both an actual multiplicity of different senses (*aequivocatio* as in the term ‘dog’ which may stand for an animal or for a celestial star, *amphibologia* as in the phrase ‘liber Aristotelis’ which could mean a book written by Aristotle or possessed by Aristotle). As Albert explains, there is a potential ambiguity, or a fallacy in *dictione*, when a verb like ‘pendere’ is pronounced with a different accent thus generating in the mind of the hearer an ambiguity; or a fallacy in *oratione*, which depends on the composition or division of terms in propositions: the classic example is “duo et tria sunt quinque,” which has a different meaning when the terms are taken together or distributively. All this is standard in medieval handbooks of

³⁸ multipliciter: multiplex F
logic. However, the connection made between potential ambiguity and phantasia seems characteristic of Albert. Potential ambiguity is an imagined ambiguity because the opponent in the discussion is deceived by the similitude of one expression with another. Besides the above quoted passage from the Sophistici Elenchi, there are other references to “potential imagined ambiguity” in the same book in tr. 4, cap. 2, p. 604a–b; cap. 5, p. 675a; cap. 8; p. 685b; in Liber divisionum, ed. Col., p. 121, 52 – 122, 3: “Secundum compositionem et divisionem et figuram dictionis non sic distinguitur, quia vel potentialium vel phantasticam et actualium et veram habent multiplicatem”; Summa theologiae, ed. Col., p. 17, 67–69: “Adhuc, aliae scientiae utuntur simpliciter univocis et non multiplicibus nec multiplicitate actuali vel potentiali vel phantastica. Ista autem multiplicibus et aequivocis utitur.” All these parallels confirm that the addition found in manuscript F undoubtedly contains authentic Albert material, and cannot be explained as a later correction in the manuscript. The other supplement too in F <affirmativa, aut quoniam non inest praedicatum subjecto in propositione> is absolutely required to understand the argument. This section also shows that one cannot always rely on F: the copyist makes many small errors and occasionally has omissions per homoioteleuton, as is the case here.

3. Rules for contraries

Topica, lib. II, tr. 2, cap. 2 (p. 314a–315a):

Dicamus igitur quod in eo quod oportet contraria sive opposita accipere et ad inhaerentias eorum inspicere, quolibet modo utile fiet oppонenti ad locum argumentationis sive ad construendum sive ad destruendum, ideo oportet videre quot modis contraria complexa per inhaerentiam ad invicem faciunt contrarietatem. Dicimus igitur quoniam contraria per inhaerentiam ad invicem faciunt contrarietatem

39 See Thomas Aquinas [?], De fallaciis, cap. 5, co.: “Actuale est quando una vox in nullo variata multa significat: et hoc si sit in una dictione, dicitur aequivocatio, ut in hoc nomine canis pro latrabili, caelesti sidere, et pro pisce marino; si in oratione, dicitur amphibologia, ut liber Aristotelis, idest ab Aristotele factus vel possessus. Multiplex potentiale est, quando una vox aliquo modo secundum prolationem variata multa significat: quod quidem est in dictione secundum accentum, ut pendere, secundum quod gravi vel acute accentu profertur, multa significat. In oratione vero est secundum compositionem et divisionem, ut: duo et tria sunt quinque: haec enim oratio diversa significat composite vel divisim prolata.”

40 in eo F: ideo α
41 ad om. F
42 inspicere: aspicere F
43 opponenti B F p: oppositi cet. codd.
44 videre F Ps p: videtur cet. codd.
45 quot: quod F
46 faciunt contrarietatem – invicem om. (hom.) F
complectuntur sibi invicem sex modis, sed non omnibus illis modis complexa ad invicem faciunt contrarietatem, ita quod alterum repugnet alteri. Sed quattuor modis contrarietatem faciunt, ita quod repugnat ad invicem et se expellunt ab eodem subiecto. Quod autem sex modis complectuntur ad invicem, patet ex hoc quod, si quattuor accipiantur contraria secundum inhaerentiae complexionem, (I) aut complectuntur, quod contrarium praedicetur de contrario, (II) aut sic quod contraria praedicentur de contrariis subjectis divisim, (III) aut quod eadem praedicentur de contrariis. (I) Et si primo contrarium <praedicetur de contrario, hoc potest esse duobus modis: directe, scilicet secundum inhaerentiam naturalem aut> \(\text{indirecte, } <\text{siclicer}>\) secundum naturalem repugnantiam; (Ia) sicut si dicam quod amici et inimici sunt duo contraria et bene facere et male facere sunt duo contraria et secundum inhaerentiam naturalem bene facere est amicis et male facere inimicis, ut dicit Socrates; hoc enim natura omnia animalia docet; sunt ergo duae complexiones quae contrarietatem non faciunt, amicis bene facere et inimicis male facere, quae ideo contraria non sunt, quia sunt eiusdem moris, qui secundum ius naturae est quod natura omnia animalia docuit, ut in MENONE dixit Socrates et Plato scribit illud de Socrate. (Ib) Aut complectuntur sibi invicem indirecte secundum repugnantiam naturalem ut amicis male facere et inimicis bene facere, et sic iterum non faciunt contrarietatem, quia sunt eiusdem malorum contra ius naturale instituti, quod est contrarium iustitiae naturali, quam natura omnia animalia docuit. (II) Aut sic complectuntur quod ambo duo contraria divisim praedicantur de uno contrariorum et hoc dupliciter, quia ambo praedicantur de uno contrario et ambo de reliquio, (IIa) ut amicis bene facere et amicis male facere, icta quod haec duo contraria praedicantur de hoc uno, quod est amicis, (IIb) et ambo de reliquio, quod est inimicis, ut inimicis male facere et inimicis bene facere; et utroque modo faciunt contrarietatem, quia amicis bene facere non est eiusdem moris cum eo quod est amicis male facere; nec eiusdem moris est inimicis bene facere et inimicis male facere. (III) Aut sic complectuntur quod

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47 modis – faciunt: faciunt contrarietatem F  
48 accipiantur: accipiuntur F  
49 praedicentur: praedicatur F  
50 primo: primum F p  
51 praedicetur – naturalem aut: om. α  
52 silicet F: om. α  
53 naturale instituti: naturali instituto F  
54 quod: quia F  
55 contrario F: contrariorum α.  
56 uno F: unico α  
57 et om. F  
58 ut inimicis om. F  
59 et om. F  
60 et om. F  
61 sic: si F  
62 quod: ita quod F
In *Topics II, 7* Aristotle discusses rules drawn from contraries. As he notices, contraries may be combined with one another in six ways, but only four of these combinations make really a contrariety. Aristotle distinguishes three possible combinations, each of which can be made in a twofold way. As examples of contrarieties he takes “to do good” versus “to do bad” and “friend” versus “enemy.” Combinations are as follows:

(I) Each of a pair of contraries will be combined with each of the other pair of contraries, and this in a twofold way:
   (a) to do good to a friend versus to do harm to an enemy;
   (b) to do harm to a friend versus to do good to an enemy.

(II) Both contraries are connected to one and the same object, and this in a twofold way:
   (a) to do good to a friend versus to do harm to a friend;
   (b) to do good to an enemy versus to do harm to an enemy.

(III) One and the same contrary of a pair can be combined with both contraries of the other pair, and this again in a twofold sense:
   (a) to do good to friends versus to do good to enemies;
   (b) to do harm to friends versus to do harm to enemies.

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63 unum praedicatum – subiectis F: om. α
64 praedicatur Ps p: ponatur K Pa ponuntur B Br E P
65 et scripsi cum p: ut codd.
66 […] haec versio in α deest in F
67 inimicis bene F: amicis male α
68 male F: bene α
69 amicis F: inimicis α (deest Br K p)
70 facit: fit iterum sive praem. F
71 et om. F
72 contra iustitiam scripsi: secundum iustitiam (iniustitiam Br E P) codd.
Aristotle finally shows that the first two combinations (Ia and Ib) are not really contrarieties, for in Ia both are examples of a virtuous action and in Ib both are examples of injustice. Only the last four make contrariety. Albert explains Aristotle’s arguments excellently. However, the Parisian tradition makes a mess of the text. In section I all manuscripts of that tradition have an omission by homoioteleuton which can be corrected thanks to F. The supplement in F is required for the argument. In section III the confusion becomes even greater: here again a passage is omitted, but in this case there has been a false attempt to supply what is missing, and the examples given are wrong. Instead of “(IIIa) ut amicis bene facere et inimicis bene facere et (IIIb) inimicis male facere et amicis male facere” as in F, we read in the α tradition “(IIIa) ut amicis bene facere et amicis male facere et (IIIb) inimicis bene facere et inimicis male facere.” The examples in α are clearly wrong in this section: they repeat the examples given in section II. Moreover, Aristotle insists that in the third combination “the same contrary is applied to both” (unum de utrisque), that is “male” to both friends and enemies, or “bene” to both friends and enemies. F rightly quotes this Aristotelean passage in the section that is omitted by the α tradition. The α manuscripts, however, attempt to fill the gap left by the omission with the insertion of another passage: “contraria praedicantur de eodem, et hoc dupliciter.” This passage, which is lacking in F, cannot be authentic, because it goes against the argument. In section III it should not be said that “contraries can be said of the same” (for this is said in section II), but that “one and the same contrary” can be said of both. Only F has preserved the authentic text. There is, however, also a problem with the text in F. One expects in the third section a twofold distinction, and the text only has “uno modo.” Therefore, I added by conjecture “altero modo quando alterum.”

4. Could God ever do evil?

Topica, lib. IV, tr. 3, cap. 1 (p. 381a–b):

Potest enim secundum hanc potentiam et deus et studiosus, hoc est: virtuosus homo, prava agere, sed tamen non sunt denominati huius quod sint pravi vel sophistae vel detractores vel latrones vel deus vel studiosus; nam omnes dicuntur pravi et nomen accipiunt secundum appetitum actualem pravitatis et non secundum potentiam pravitatem faciendi, quia illa est a natura ipsa.

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73 tamen F (“sed tamen” frequenter in Alberto): om. α
74 vel om. F
75 pravitatis: pravitas F
76 illa F: alia α anima p
In *Topics* IV, 5, 126a30–126b2, Aristotle discusses errors that may occur in an argument when someone describes a person having a *capacity* of doing something blameworthy as being himself actually blameworthy, for example, when he calls ‘thief’ someone who is capable of stealing the good of others. Aristotle corrects this manner of speech. It does not suffice that someone is capable to do bad things to consider him as blameworthy. “For even God and the virtuous man are capable of doing bad things, but they are not such themselves (the wicked, however, are of such a character because of their deliberate choice of evil).” “Furthermore, a capacity is always among the things worthy of choice, for even capacities for evil are worthy of choice; and so we say that God and the virtuous man possess them, for we say that they are capable of doing evil.” One may imagine that Albert was puzzled, if not shocked by Aristotle’s explanation. That the capacity of free choice is a good for humans, even if this is a capacity of doing evil, is a view shared by all medieval thinkers since Augustine in their defence of divine providence. For providence allows evil to happen because it created beings with a capacity of doing evil. However, nobody would dare to say that God himself was capable of doing evil, but deliberately choose not to do it. Therefore, Albert has to explain the text in such a way that Aristotle’s view does not contradict Christian doctrine. If we read the text in the Paris tradition (and in the Borgnet edition corresponding to it), Albert gives the following explanation: “I call God according to the definition of the gods, who is not capable of willing evil, for the capacity to will evil things is not a sign of power, but of a lack of power and defect.”

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77 decipientem: deceptionem F
78 susurratorem scripsi cum B p sussuronem F susurationem cet. codd.
79 dividens addidi
80 nos scripsi: non F
81 quos posuit – deorum F: om. α
82 impotentia et defectus: defectus et impotentia F
83 dico: voco F
qui nihil pravum velle potest, quia pravum velle non est potentia, sed impoten-
tia et defectus). The text as it stands poses many difficulties. First of all: it goes
diametrically against what Aristotle says himself, namely that god has the capac-
ity to do evil, but does not want to do it. And why is Albert’s explanation here
“according to the definition of the gods (in plural!”) (secundum diffinitionem de-
orum)? And why does he continue after “deorum” with the singular form of the
verb “qui nihil pravum velle potest”? All problems are solved if we read the text
with the supplement as found in F: “Deum autem dico secundum diffinitionem de-
orum, <quos posuit Socrates «dividens» in caelestes, terrestres et infernales,
quos daymones, hoc est intellectus quosdam, vocavit, quos nos daemones per
syncopam dicimus, et non deum deorum,> qui nihil velle potest…” In transla-
tion: “I now take God according to the definition of the gods, which Socrates
posited, <distinguishing> celestial, terrestrial and infernal, which he called day-
mones, that is intellects, and we call demons by syncope [daymones>demones],
and I do not take God to be ‘the God of gods’, who is not capable of willing
to do evil.” The addition in F is absolutely required to make sense of Albert’s
argument. He wants to show that Aristotle takes here the name ‘God’ not for
the supreme God, the “God of gods” as Plato in the
Timaeus
(cf. Tim. 41 A6)
called him and as God is called in the Bible (Dan. XI, 36): this God is indeed
incapable of doing evil things. But Aristotle understands ‘God’ in the sense of
the multitude of inferior gods which the pagan philosophers called “daymones,”
but which are in fact for Christians demons. Now the argument makes perfect
sense, and the scandal of Aristotle’s statement is removed by explaining it as
a reference to the pagan inferior gods. No later corrector of Albert’s work could
ever have invented this supplement by conjecture. The authenticity of this line
is confirmed by the following parallels. That Socrates posited demons as gods,
and that some of them may become evil, is said in De causis et processu, ed. Col.,
p. 92, 10–13: “Hesiodus enim et Socrates et Plato deos esse ponebant, in calo-
daemones et in cacodaemones omnes intellectuales substantias post primam
causam dividentes;” see also Summa theologiae, ed. Col., p. 216, 66–74: “Per nat-
uram, sicut poeta et quidam philosophi corpora caelestia et virtutes caelestium
et quasdam virtutes terrestrium et quasdam etiam virtutes infernalium deos esse
dicebant participacione virtutis divinae. Propter quod, ut dicit Apuleius in libro
de deo Socratis, deos dividebant in incorporeos et corporeos. Corporeos autem
dividebant in caelestes, subcaelestes sive terrestres et infernales.” That the Greek
philosophers considered these demonic beings as intelligences is often said by
Albert: “Alia via est theologizantium antiquorum, qui angelos et daemones po-
nebant esse huiusmodi substantias, dividentes angelos in bonos et malos, sicut et
Stoici in cacodaemones et calodaemones disverant. ‘Daymon’ enim in Graeco
idem est quod ‘intellectus’ ” (De causis et processu, ed. Col., p. 92, 18–22; see also
De V univ., p. 65, 61–64). On the use of the expression “deum deorum” to indicate the first superior God see Metaph., ed. Col., p. 64, 8–10; 72, 92–93; 103, 13–15; 126, 50–51; 156, 89–91.

5. OTHER EXAMPLES OF SUPPLEMENTS IN F

Topica, lib. I, tr. 4, cap. 9 (p. 287b):

Hoc autem ‘vel enim’, quod est paralogizare protervum, non in omnibus orationibus est possibile, sicut quando in utroque sensu falsa vel in utroque sensu vera, sed tunc est possibile, quando multiplicia fiunt de numero eorum, quorum unum hoc uno sensu acceptum verum et in altero falsum.

Topica, lib. II, tr. 1, cap. 4 (p. 301a):

Non enim aliter sufficit disputasse, si uni inest, quoniam omni inest nisi cum praeconfessione, ut si ostendatur, quoniam anima unius hominis immortalis est, quod probatum sit quod anima hominis simpliciter et universaliter sit immortalis; hoc enim est verisimile, propter quod prius concedendum et praeconfitendum est a respondent si quaedam anima immortalis est, quod sequatur quoniam omnis hominis anima est immortalis.

Topica, lib. II, tr. 1, cap. 7 (p. 307b):

quandoque autem tertio modo neque necessarium neque apparens, sed digressio fit ad ipsum propter protervitatem respondentis ut in aliquo saltem conclusus stetur et sic cesset protervire; et sic patet quod digressio fit aut propter respondentem aut propter propositum.

Topica, lib. III, tr. 1, cap. 7 (p. 345a):

Amplius de multiplicatione et incremento boni est quod cuius superabundantia in actibus et affectu magis est eligenda et ipsum magis est eligendum ut amicitia superabundans in actu et affectu magis est eligenda quam pecuniae, cuius superabundantia non est bonum; quamvis enim superabundantia et egestas relatae ad medium virtutis causent vitium et fugiendum, tamen in bonis superabundantia in operibus et affectu et possessione bona est et eligenda. Et ideo magis

84 sicut – possibile F: om. (hom.) α
85 et F: etiam α
86 aliter F: alicui cet. codd.
87 probatum – est quod F: om. (hom.) α
88 stetur scripsi: ustent (?) F
89 saltem – digressio F: om. α
90 affectu: effectu F
91 et ipsum – eligenda F: om. (hom.) α
92 pecuniae: pecunia quod F
93 relatae F: circulare α
eligenda superabundantia amicitiae in actibus et affectibus \textit{et operibus}\footnote{et operibus F: \textit{om. }\alpha} quam pecuniarum. Dico autem ‘in operibus et affectibus’, quia superabundantia in numero amicorum verorum non est eligenda, ut dicitur in VIII\textsuperscript{o} ethicorum.

\textit{Topica}, lib. VI, tr. 2, cap. 6 (p. 451b):

Cuius prima ratio est quia in amplius \textit{et communis differentia praedicatur quam species}; magis autem commune in essentiali praedicatione non universaliter subicitur minus communi; sic ergo differentia interimitur et etiam diffinitio. Amplius\footnote{et communis – amplius F: \textit{om. (hom.) }\alpha} aliud inconsequens sequitur.

\textit{Topica}, lib. VI, tr. 7, cap. 1 (p. 474a):

Si autem aliquis dicat quod totum integrale per partes suas diffinitum non est hoc et hoc, ut partes in recto divisim vel conjunctim de toto \textit{praedicentur, sed diffinitur ex partibus secundo modo scilicet quia est ex his ut scilicet partes obliquae de toto}\footnote{praedicentur (\textit{scripsi:} -cetur F) – toto F: \textit{om. (hom.) }\alpha} praedicentur.

\textit{Topica}, lib. VII, tr. 1, cap. 1 (p. 480b):

Similiter detur quod Peloponii sint fortissimi; ergo sunt fortiores Lacedaemonii. \textit{Sed si}\footnote{sed si F p: ergo sed }\alpha\footnote{(sed K)} quicquid est fortius Peloponii, \textit{est etiam fortius Lacedaemonis; ergo Lacedaemonii, cum sint fortiores Peloponii,}\footnote{est etiam – Peloponesiis F: \textit{om. (hom.) }\alpha} erunt fortiores se ipsis.

\textit{Topica}, lib. VIII, tr. 2, cap. 7 (p. 514b):

Hic bene disputat et oratione non increpanda, quia cum argumentum \textit{sit ratio rei dubiae faciens fides, contra naturam et finem argumenti est}\footnote{sit – argumenti est F: \textit{om. (hom.) }\alpha} ex improbabilioribus procedere.

The definition of ‘argumentum’ (“argumentum est ratio rei dubiae faciens fidem”) is taken from Boethius (\textit{In Ciceronis Topica}, p. 276, 43) and is often quoted by Albert. See further in this same chapter p. 515b, and \textit{Soph. El.}, p. 527a, 586b; \textit{Sent.}, III, p. 404b, 405b, 437a; IV, p. 236b; \textit{De incarnatione}, ed. Col., p. 173, 10–11; \textit{Summa theol.}, ed. Col., p. 19, 13–14; 77, 94–95; \textit{Quaestiones}, ed. Col., p. 240, 9–10. The parallels confirm the authenticity of the supplement in F.
Conclusion

The evidence adduced above leaves no doubt: the Florence manuscript, which is a mediocre recent copy of Albert’s *Topics*, must have an important role in the constitution of a critical text of Albert’s work. As it is the only textual witness outside the Parisian tradition, it makes us see and correct the numerous errors, which tainted the copy of Albert’s text, which was sent to Paris in the seventies of the 13th century. Unfortunately, the text in F is itself disfigured by many errors, including numerous omissions. In some cases, the copyist included in the text alternative readings due to an unclear abbreviation in his model.¹⁰⁰ He also inserted Aristotelian passages that were not commented upon by Albert (they make come from marginal notes). It is premature to give a full evaluation of F. It seems, however, that the manuscript was not copied directly from Albert’s autograph, but from an early copy of it (subarchetype β).¹⁰¹ In contrast to the Florence manuscript, a recent and mediocre copy, stands the Erlangen manuscript: it is the oldest of the surviving copies and the closest to Albert’s original text and it certainly has the best copy quality. However, a good copy cannot set right the errors that were already in its model (α). It needs a substantial correction, which is partially possible thanks to F, the only representative of the tradition β outside Paris. The editor is thus confronted with a bifurcation of the tradition and will have to make a judicious choice between the text as present in E (and P, the other representative of the Parisian tradition before the university exemplar) and the text in F. Given the early date of E and P it is recommendable to follow these manuscripts “in indifferentibus” for example in variations as “istud/illud” or “igitur/ergo” and inversions. The editor will take F whenever the sense of the argument requires it or parallel passages in Albert’s other works confirm it, and when palaeographical reasons can be given for the

¹⁰⁰ Examples: diffinitio vel divisio; diffinientis vel diffinitionis; contrarium vel contrarie; determinavit sive determinando; sumptus sive positus; delectationis sive delectabilis; huius est sive illius est; principium sive primum; positio sive conclusio; propinquam sive propriam; constitutionis sive considerationis; conclusendum sive construendum; facit iterum sive fit iterum; vehuntur sive moventur. These alternative readings may have been ‘aliae lectiones’ in the margin of the model.

¹⁰¹ It is not impossible that an autograph of Albert’s Logic (or parts of it) still circulated in the 15th century in Italy. See for instance Venetianus Marc. Lat. VI, 227 (=2566); f. 38r: “Liber periermenias Alberti Magni, Ratisponensis episcopi, finitus Bononie et scriptus anno domini 1459 quinta die mensis iulii. Est enim iste liber periermencias cum originali Alberti manibus eius propris scripto collacionatus ac de verbo ad verbum correctus”; f. 173v: “Explicit commentum domini Alberti Magni super duobus libris priorum Analyticorum scriptum necon completum per me Augustinum Cumanum de Dypenbara in artibus Magistrum anno domini 1461 decima septima die mensis februrii, sumptum ex originali propris manibus eiusdem Alberti scripto ac cum eodem collacionatum et de verbo ad verbum correctum anno eodem mensis iunii die 15.”
errors in the Parisian archetype. The discussion of the texts above has shown that a new critical edition of the *Topics* will substantially modify the standard text in Borgnet and contribute to a better understanding of Albert’s argument, even in theological questions.

**Summary**

Albert’s monumental paraphrase on the *Topics* remains terra incognita for scholars in medieval philosophy. Before its importance can be truly assessed we need a critical edition of this text. The present article offers some prolegomena for a future edition. Of the eight manuscripts transmitting Alberts *Topics* seven belong to the Parisian tradition (including five depending on the university exemplar). Only one manuscript, Florence Laur. Conv. Sopp. 195, copied in 1427, is independent from that tradition and makes it possible to correct the numerous errors of the Paris tradition and in particular its omissions. Parallel texts in Albert demonstrate that the supplementary texts one finds in the Florence manuscript are certainly authentic and cannot be explained as conjectural additions. A new edition will reveal Albert’s text in a form radically different from the standard Borgnet edition.

**Keywords:** Albert the Great, *Topics*, medieval philosophy, manuscript Laur. Conv. Sopp. 195

**Słowa klucze:** Albert Wielki, *Topiki*, średniowieczna filozofia, rękopis Laur. Conv. Sopp. 195